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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46(b)-16 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
801(8)(1997). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented in this matter concerns the constitutionality of Section 
34A-2-413(5), Utah Code Ann. under the equal protection clause of the 14t! 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of 
the Utah State Constitution which provides that all laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation. 
Under Section 63-46b-16(4),U.C.A., the Court reviews the 
constitutionality of a statute upon which the Labor Commission's action is 
based without deference, as a conclusion of law. Velarde v. Board of 
Review, 831 P.2d 123 (Ut. Ct App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
14 Amendment, United States Constitution: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
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abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, (emphasis added) 
Section 34A-2-413(5), Utah Code Annotated (1997): 
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in 
Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the 
employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received 
compensation from the employer or the employer's 
insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities 
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the 
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be 
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar 
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits 
received by the employee during the same period. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURE 
1. Mr. Merrill filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah 
Labor Commission on February 21, 2003 against Vermax of Florida, Inc., 
dba Dakota Cabinet and Mill. He alleged two workplace injuries with that 
employer: May 14, 1998 and April 13, 2001. (R. at 1-7). 
2. Following an evidentiary hearing, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order were issued on April 29, 2004 by the Utah 
Labor Commission where in interim Permanent Total Disability benefits 
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awarded based upon the May 14, 1998 injury. No liability was found 
against the Workers Compensation Find for the April 13, 2001 injury. (R. 
at 19-34). 
3. A Final Order was issued on May 12, 2004 by the Utah Labor 
Commission. (R. at 35-40). 
4. A Motion for Review was filed by Wausau Business Insurance 
on June 1, 2004 contesting its liability for the PTD benefits and also 
concerning its right to submit a so-called re-employment plan. (R. at 41-
55). 
5. An Order Granting the Motion for Review in part and an 
Order of Remand was issued by the Utah Labor Commission on January 
31, 2005. (R. at 65-69) wherein the liability of Wausau for PTD benefits 
was affirmed, however the Labor Commission afforded Wausau the 
opportunity to submit a reemployment plan. 
6. On February 1, 2005 an order concerning Wausau's right to 
submit a reemployment plan was issued by the Labor Commission. (R. at 
71-73). 
7. On March 24, 2005 a Final Order was issued by the Labor 
Commission. (R. at 78-83). 
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8. Wausau filed a Motion for Review on that order on April 7, 
2005. (R. at 84-87). 
9. An Order of Remand was issued by the Labor Commission on 
February 1, 2006. (R. at 105-107). Following that order, a date was set for 
a hearing concerning the issues of credit for disability benefits paid against 
a PTD award and concerning whether after payment of the first 312 weeks 
of PTD benefits whether the insurance carrier is entitled to a reduction 
against such compensation of an amount representing 50% of any Social 
Security retirement benefits received by the injured worker. (R. at 109-110) 
10. A Supplemental Order on Remand was issued by the Utah 
Labor Commission on May 17, 2006. (R. at 131-137). 
11. Petitioner filed a Motion for Review on June 7, 2006 
concerning the constitutionality of the so-called reverse offset statute found 
in Section 34A-2-413(5), Utah Code Annotated. (R. at 138-142). 
12. An Order Denying Motion for Review was issued by the Utah 
Labor Commission on June 29, 2006. (R. at 154-156) 
13. Petitioner filed his Petition for Review with the Utah Court of 
Appeals on July 28, 2006. 
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FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute in this case. 
1. Petitioner Nathan Merrill sustained a low back injury at work 
on May 14, 1998 while employed by Vermax of Florida, Inc. (dba Dakota 
Cabinet and Mill). At that time, he was 60 years old. 
2. At that time Vermax was insured, for workers compensation 
purposes, by Wausau Business Insurance. 
3. Pursuant to a Labor Commission approved compensation 
agreement, he was paid a total of $6,770.40 for a 7% PPD rating 
commencing October 29, 1999. This was equivalent to $310 per week for 
21.84 weeks. 
4. Mr. Merrill sustained a temporary aggravation of the 
underlying back condition at work for the same employer on April 13, 
2001. At that time Vermax was insured, for workers compensation 
purposes, by the Workers Compensation Fund. Following the injury, he 
continued to work, albeit with increasing difficulty. 
5. He stopped working due to his injuries on August 28, 2001. 
6. Permanent Total Disability (PTD) benefits of $395.00 per 
week were subsequently awarded by that Utah Labor Commission effective 
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August 28, 2001 based upon the May 14, 1998 injury. As of August 2001, 
Mr. Merrill was 63 years old. (R. at 32). 
7. Mr. Merrill is currently 68 years old and is receiving Social 
Security retirement benefits. 
8. Prior to receiving retirement benefits from the Social Security 
Administration, Mr. Merrill received Social Security disability benefits. 
These were paid after August of 2001 and until he reached full retirement 
age, at which point benefits were switched to retirement benefits, although 
the amount paid remained the same. 
9. Under the terms of the final order of the Utah Labor 
Commission, after Mr. Merrill has received six years of PTD benefits, in 
August of 2007, because he is now receiving Social Security retirement 
benefits, his PTD benefits will be reduced by half of the amount of his 
monthly Social Security retirement check. This will reduce his net income 
by about 20%. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Section 34A-2-413(5), U.C.A. violates Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution as well as Section 1 of the 14 Amendment of the United 
States Constitution in that it treats people differently within the classes 
8 
created by the statute without providing a rational basis or having a 
reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the Workers Compensation 
Act. The only reason for the offset created is to save the insurance industry 
money without providing any benefit to disabled workers in return. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Section 34A-2-413(5) does not apply equally to 
all persons within the class created by the 
statute. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, the Uniform Operation 
of Law Clause, is considered to be the Utah equivalent of the federal equal 
protection guarantee in the 14 Amendment that "persons similarly situated 
should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should 
not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Wood v. Univ. of 
Utah Medical Center, 67 P.3d 436 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002), and Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 669 (Utah 1984). 
Under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, a two-part test 
is needed in the analysis of ensuring uniform operation of the laws: "First, a 
law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory 
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classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based 
on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of 
the statute. Malan v. Lewis at 670. 
The first prong of the analysis presupposes the creation of classes 
within a law and requires a consideration of the level of scrutiny applied to 
the discrimination inherent in any classification. In State v. Merrill, 2005 
UT 34 (UT 2005), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that: 
Every legislative act is in one sense discriminatory. The 
Legislature cannot in one act legislate as to all persons or all 
subject matters. It is inclusive as to some class or group and as 
to some human relationships, transactions, or functions and 
exclusive as to the remainder. For that reason, to be 
unconstitutional, the discrimination must be unreasonable or 
arbitrary. A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in 
its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is some 
basis for the differentiation between classes or subject matters 
included as compared to those excluded from its operation 
provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the 
purposes to be accomplished by the act. 
Attention is now given to the specifics of the issue before this Court. 
Prior to 1988, the Workers Compensation Act provided that any 
person who was awarded permanent total disability benefits by the Utah 
Labor Commission would receive those PTD benefits, without reduction, 
for the rest of their lives. Section 35-1-68. 
Persons receiving PTD benefits (or any workers compensation 
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benefit) who also received Social Security disability benefits were subject 
to the offset provisions of the Social Security Act such that their Social 
Security disability benefits would be reduced if the individual was also 
receiving workers' compensation benefits and the combined SSDI and WC 
benefits exceeded 80% of the person's average current earnings (ACE) as 
defined by law.1 
At full retirement age (age 65), the Social Security offset would stop 
(because Social Security disability benefits would stop) and the 
permanently totally disabled worker could receive full Social Security 
Retirement benefits along with his continuing PTD benefits. 
In 1988, the Utah Legislature made a new and significant change to 
the forerunner of current Section 34A-2-413(5), U.C.A., which was Section 
35-1-68(4), U.C.A. It required that a person receiving PTD benefits, after 
he or she had received 312 weeks of benefits, and after he or she had begun 
to receive Social Security retirement benefits, that the monthly PTD amount 
The procedure for determining the maximum amount of workers' compensation benefits that 
can be received before an offset would be made against Social Security disability benefits involves 
looking at the last five years that a person worked before becoming disabled. The best earnings year in 
that five year period is taken and the monthly average is determined by dividing the year's gross income 
by 12. That resulting number is called the ACE (average current earnings). An alternative method that 
can be used in determining the ACE is to look at any consecutive five year period during a person's work 
life and to then divide by 60. If the resulting number gives a higher average than the average month in 
the last year's earnings, then that number can be used as the person's ACE. Once the ACE is determined, 
80% of that number will equal the maximum amount of Social Security disability benefits and workers' 
compensation benefits that a person can receive during any given month. If the sum of the two exceeds 
80% of the ACE, then Social Security disability benefits will be reduced until the 80% of ACE figure is 
not exceeded. 20 CFR 404.408. 
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would automatically be reduced by 50% of the Social Security retirement 
benefits received by the injured worker during the same period. There is no 
requirement in the statute for a reduction of PTD benefits due to the receipt 
of any other kind of retirement or pension benefit. 
How much a person is paid in Social Security disability and/or 
retirement benefits depends upon the earnings history of the worker. After 
a disabled worker begins to receive Social Security disability benefits, that 
benefit amount, before any offset by Social Security, will remain the same 
once the individual reaches full retirement age. Any offset taken by Social 
Security at that time ends and a full benefit check is paid each month. 
Depending upon the earnings history of the worker, he may or may 
not receive Social Security disability benefits. This can depend upon when 
the person became disabled, the length of time that the worker paid into the 
Social Security system, and other various factors. For example, normally, a 
person must have at least 40 work credits in order to be qualified for 
disability benefits (assuming he is disabled and meets the medical 
requirements for disability). A credit is earned for each calendar quarter of 
a year that the person works and pays into the Social Security system. For 
each quarter of a year that a person does not work or pay into the system, a 
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credit is lost. (This can be because of employment that is exempt from the 
Social Security system or because a person is not working). After five 
years of not working or paying into the system, a person may become 
uninsured for disability purposes and despite becoming disabled, will not be 
able to receive Social Security disability benefits. 
At full-retirement age, provided that the disabled worker has received 
312 weeks of PTD benefits, any Social Security offset ends and under 
current Utah law a disabled worker's PTD check will be reduced by half of 
the monthly Social Security retirement check. 
The results can vary widely. 
The Petitioner's situation provides a good example. Mr. Merrill was 
earning $27.50 per hour on a full-time basis while working as a carpenter at 
Vermax. His yearly income was about $57,200.00. This results in an ACE 
of $4,766.00. 80% of that ACE is $3,813.00. Had he been on SSDI after 
he became disabled, he would have received about $1,100.00 per month in 
SSDI benefits. His PTD award equates to $1,710.00 per month. The two 
amounts add up to $2,810. Because this sum is less than his ACE, there is 
no Social Security disability offset. 
Because Mr. Merrill is receiving Social Security retirement benefits 
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of about $1,100.00 per month, after August 2007 once he is been paid 312 
weeks of PTD benefits, under the operation of section 34A-2-413(5), 
U.C.A. he will experience a cut of about $550 per month from his PTD 
benefits because of the offset mandated by Section 34A-2-413(5). This 
means his net income will decrease from over $2,800 per month to $2,260 
per month - merely because he has reached retirement age. This represents 
a 20% reduction in income based solely on his age. 
Through no fault of his own, instead of continuing to be able to earn 
as much as $50,000 per year in a skilled occupation, plus receive Social 
Security retirement benefits, he is reduced, because of his injuries, to 
income of about $33,720 per year. After the reverse offset in August of 
2007, his annualized income will drop over $6,000 and be limited to about 
$27,000 per year in combined PTD and Social Security retirement benefits. 
The only difference, post injury, being that he is over the age of 65. 
People in situations similar to Mr. Merrill, but who are otherwise 
much younger than him when their PTD benefits begin, would receive 
SSDI benefits and PTD benefits for any number of years until retirement 
age is reached - with no reduction until then. The only factor that triggers 
this reduction is a person's age. 
14 
Section 34A-2-413(5) appears to create two main classifications of 
people. For this analysis, we may assume that all injured workers entitled 
to workers compensation PTD benefits are similarly situated. They have all 
suffered a work place injury resulting in permanent impairment and their 
recourse for compensation due to the impact of that injury is limited solely 
to the provisions of the Utah Workers' Compensation (or Occupational 
Disease) Act. 
The first group or classification consists of those injured workers 
eligible for PTD benefits that receive or are eligible to receive Social 
Security retirement benefits. The second class consists of PTD claimants 
who will not receive and are not eligible for Social Security retirement 
benefits. The chronological age of the claimant is the only distinguishing 
factor between the two classes. Age and eligibility for Social Security 
retirement benefits are both unrelated to one's ability to engage in regular 
steady or meaningful employment. We submit that for these reasons, these 
classes are similarly situated for equal protection/uniform operation of law. 
Within the first classification are two subgroups. The first consists 
of those who receive Social Security disability benefits until they reach full 
retirement age. The seconds consists of those who do not receive Social 
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Security disability, which may occur for varying reasons, including the 
length of time that the person paid into the Social Security system and when 
the disability began. Of the first group, there are two further subclasses. 
They consist of those whose Social Security disability benefits are reduced 
because of their receipt of workers' compensation benefits and the subclass 
of those whose historical wages were high enough that there is no offset 
made by Social Security against their workers' compensation benefits. 
A person who is PTD receives a certain amount of monthly benefits 
under the workers compensation system and that amount is guaranteed for 
six years. After reaching age 65, and if six years of PTD benefits have 
already been paid, the disabled worker's income will be immediately 
reduced by half of his monthly Social Security retirement check. 
If a person receiving PTD benefits was not receiving Social Security 
disability prior to reaching full retirement age, upon beginning to receive 
Social Security retirement, the net impact on his monthly income will be an 
increase of only half as much as he otherwise would have received, because 
of the 50% offset. 
If a person does not receive any Social Security or other retirement 
pension at all, then there is no change in income at the so-called full 
2 This may be due to various reasons, such as prior Civil Service or other employment that does not pay 
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retirement age. 
However, those who do not receive Social Security, but have a civil 
service pension or other old-age benefits, will receive those pensions as 
well as a full workers' compensation PTD check each month. 
The outcomes vary wildly depending upon the circumstances but are 
discriminatory as they are based solely on a person's age. 
It could also be said that the statute discriminates against the disabled 
in favor or the able bodied, which would invoke strict scrutiny of the 
statute. If PTD benefits are considered to constitute wage replacement for 
workers under the age of 65, which is a commonly recognized concept, 
then at full-retirement age when Social Security retirement becomes 
available for all workers who have paid into the system, and when Social 
Security disability benefits end, the able bodied receive their retirement 
benefits and have the option of continuing to work as well to maintain their 
desired or needed income. 
However, those who are PTD do not have that option. They did not 
join their statutory classification by choice. They did not volunteer, but 
were forced there by virtue of damage to their bodies by injury or accident 
in their employment. They cannot work. They have no wage earning 
into the Social Security system, length of time spent working in the United States, or other reasons. 
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capacity and those in this classification who receive Social Security 
retirement benefits have forced upon them a permanent reduction in their 
net income because of the operation of Section 34A-2-413(5), with no 
means to make up for the loss. 
Yet, within the class of those who are permanently totally disabled, 
We submit that for these reasons, people similarly situated are not 
treated similarly. 
POINT II 
Section 34A-2-413(5) has no rational basis and 
shows no legitimate tendency to further the 
purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act 
The second prong of the analysis pertains to whether this different 
treatment has a reasonable tendency to further the purposes of the statute. 
What are the legitimate purposes of the statute? What is the purpose 
of the Workers' Compensation Act? While the Act itself does not contain a 
description of its objectives, the early case of Park Utah Consolidated 
Mines v. Industrial Commission, 36 P.2d 979 (Utah 1934) provides a good 
description. It explains that the Act is a beneficent law that affords injured 
workers "simple, adequate, and speedy means of securing compensation, to 
the end that the cost of human wreckage may be taxed against the industry 
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that employs it." It is intended to indemnify injured workers when they 
cease to earn wages. 
As a policy matter, wage-loss benefits, such as PTD benefits, are not 
intended to make an injured worker whole, nor are they intended to 
represent full wage replacement. Rather, they would appear to be 
intended to assist a worker at a reasonable cost to the employer. 
We submit, however, that a law enacted merely to save costs to an 
employer or its insurance carrier, at the expense of the injured worker, and 
with no benefit to the injured worker in return, is an impermissible and 
dismal way for the industry to save money - on the backs of people who are 
just trying to get by following life changing injuries. Greater emphasis on 
policies to reduce workplace accidents, increase workplace safety and find 
ways to improve medical care and return an injured worker back to the 
workplace sooner, or to get appropriate retraining, would benefit both the 
injured worker and the industry, and would ultimately save the industry 
much more money than reducing the income of our State's senior citizens. 
We can see no rational basis nor any legitimate purpose which would 
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the workers 
compensation act that would justify the change in the law by the 1988 
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legislature which enacted this substantial modification of prior statutory law 
- as before that time, there was and had been no offset from workers' 
compensation benefits due to the receipt of Social Security or any other 
benefit. 
Social Security retirement benefits are not wage replacement benefits 
and hence there is no duplication of benefits to be avoided when a worker 
qualifies for old age Social Security retirement benefits. People who have 
reached full retirement age can still work as well as receive full retirement 
benefits with absolutely no reduction in benefits because of their earnings. 
42U.S.C.402. 
Considered in another light, why should a person's PTD benefits be 
reduced by eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits when the 
injury itself did not increase or enhance in any way the amount of the 
ultimate social security benefit? 
While the Social Security Act does impose an offset from Social 
Security disability benefits due to the receipt of workers compensation 
benefits prior to age 65, Section 34A-2-413(5), U.C.A on the same logic 
cannot impose a reverse offset from Social Security retirement benefits 
once the disability offset ends at age 65. Social Security disability and 
20 
Social Security retirement, while sharing a common name are two distinct 
programs based on two completely different concepts. 
There is nothing in the different treatment given the classes created 
by Section 34A-2-413(5) that has a rational basis or any reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statute or of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
This portion of the Act should be found to be unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 34A-2-413(5) of the Workers Compensation Act 
violates Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, Uniform Operation 
of Law and the 14 Amendment of the United States Constitution as it 
pertains to equal protection under the law. It treats injured workers in 
impermissibly different ways and serves only to save money for the 
insurance industry with no benefit back to disabled workers and their 
families. It has no rational basis or any reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute or of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Dated this 3rd day of November, 2006 
Phillip B. Shell 0 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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